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ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS: SHIFTING
THE PRIVACY BURDEN AWAY FROM WITNESSES AND
VICTIMS
1.

INTRODUCTION

On June 14, 2005 the Maryland Court of Appeals ordered that
information which has historically been available in hard copy at
courthouses will also be made available electronically. I This
decision came over the protests of prosecutors and victims' rights
advocates who feared that the heightened availability would further
enable victim and witness intimidation. 2 Prosecutors raised
concerns about the differences between electronic and traditional
access to court records. 3 According to Baltimore City State's
Attorney Patricia C. Jessamy, "[t]here's a marked difference
between going to a courthouse and having to interact face to face
to get the information and doing it anonymously at a computer
terminal. ,,4
Roberta Roper, the founder of the Maryland Crime Victims'
Resource Center, urged the court to maintain the existing block
which disallowed "the electronic dissemination of personal
information of crime victims and witnesses."s Ms. Roper argued
that the public interest concern of protecting the dignity and safety
of victims and witnesses outweighs the countervailing interest of
making the information available electronically.6 Particularly, Ms.
Roper pointed out that lifting the block would lead to an increased
ability to be threatened. 7
Current practice includes that clerks notify
victims and witnesses by subpoena or summons
through the judicial database.
Subpoenas and
summons are often included in the court files.
However in order to examine these documents,
those viewing the files will have to sign in and show
identification to view the court file. If a victim or
I.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Julie Bykowicz, Make Court Data Available Electronically, Judges Order, BALT.
SUN, June 15, 2005, at 2B.
/d.; Letter from Roberta Roper, Founder, Md. Crime Victims' Res. etr., to The
Md. Court of Appeals (June 14,2005) (on file with author).
Bykowicz, supra note I. While many commentators are concerned about
electronic access as it applies to all types of cases in which a person's private
information is widely disseminated, the focus of this Comment is limited to the
issue of access to victim and witness telephone numbers and addresses as found
in criminal court records.
Bykowicz, supra note I.
Letter from Roberta Roper, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
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witness is intimidated, an investigation can occur to
review who had access to the court file to trace and
identify the potential intimidator. . .. Under the
new Rules terminal access will provide anonymous
access to personal information of victims and
witnesses. With anonymous access, there will be no
opportunity to trace who may have threatened or
harmed a victim or witness . . .. There will be a
chilling effect for victims and witnesses if they
learn that their personal information will be
electronically disseminated. 8
The National Network to End Domestic Violence raised the
point that the ability to find a victim's name and address on a court
website allows a batterer or stalker to find the victim. 9 "This
encroachment on privacy and the resulting threat to personal safety
will discourage victims of domestic violence from seeking
protection from their abusers just as it will discourage witnesses
from helping to end the violence through their testimony." 10
Despite these· concerns, the Court of Appeals unanimously
refused to continue the status quo as to a block on electronic
information of victims and witnesses and fassed Title 16, Chapter
1000, of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. 1 .
Under these rules, a witness or victim whose address and
telephone number has appeared in the court record will carry the
burden of proactively making certain that his or her personal
information does not become widely disseminated over the
Internet. 12
To achieve this goal of privacy, victims and witnesses of
domestic violence or those who have obtained a protective order
may re~uest to have certain information withheld from the public
1
record.
Other victims and witnesses must file a motion to have
information withheld. This motion must be sent to the State's
Attorney and to the defense attorney.14 Before a permanent
removal of the personal information, the victim or witness will be
required to attend a hearing at which he must make a case to the
judge as to why his motion should be granted and his information
8.
9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.

Id.
National Network to End Domestic Violence, Public & Internet Access to Court
Records, Safety Net: The Nat'l Safe & Strategic Tech. Project 1, 2 (on file with
author).
Id.
Bykowicz, supra note I;· Janet Stidman Eveleth, New Rules Open Court Records
to Public, MD. B. BULL., Aug. 15,2005, at I.
See infra notes 211-222 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 219-222 and accompanying text.
See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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should be withheld. 15 The victi'm's offender has a right to be
present at this hearing. 16
Additionally, ,Maryland law does not provide a mechanism for
victims to find out about this right to request that their personal
information be withheld. 17 Neither the court, nor the police are
required to inform the victims of their right. 18 Victims are forced
to find a knowledgeable advocate who can help them file the
aforementioned request and assist them with the hearing that will
follow. 19
This is a tremendous burden to place on victims and witnesses.
This Comment will argue that the burden of proving why the
telephone numbers and addresses of these people should not be left
in the public record should be shifted to the defer.dant. 20
Part II of this Comment will examine the development and
current state of electronic access to court records. 2I It will explain
how electronic access is problematic and how certain jurisdictions
have moved to keep victim and witness telephone numbers and
addresses protected from remote access. 22 Part III will discuss the
regulation of public records as a whole. 23 It will examine the
courts' attempts to balance public access to court records with the
privacy interests of victims and witnesses. 24
Part IV will propose a solution that will protect the information
of victims and witnesses in Maryland, without impeding the
courts' move towards electronic record keeping. 25
II.

ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS

This section will examine the electronic access to court records
through a discussion of the shift away from traditional paper
records,26 a synofsis of Maryland's implementation of an
electronic system, 2 a discussion of how this shift affects the
privacy of individuals,28 and an analogy between remote access to
court records and the electronic dissemination of public
IS.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See infra notes 211-218 and accompanying text.
See MD. R. 16-1009 (indicating that a full adversarial hearing is required before
granting motion to limit access to record).
See Eveleth, supra note II, at I.
See generally supra note II, at 1.
See generally supra note II, at 1.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II(A).
See infra Part 11(8).
See infra Part II(C).
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information that occurred with the passage of Megan's Law
legislation. 29 It will then examine how other jurisdictions have
addressed the problem of personal information in the public record
being disseminated electronically30 and will explain the current
Maryland Rules and summarize the recently adopted amendments
to those rules. 31
A.

The Shift from Paper Records to Electronic Records

Historically, court records were kept using the traditional means
of notebooks, cabinets, and cardboard boxes. 32 In order to access
these records, an interested party "had to travel to the local
courthouse of a particular jurisdiction and scan the columns in a
court ledger or flip through a narrow drawer of carefully
alphabetized index cards.,,33
In recent years, courts have followed technological trends and
have begun to shift from paper-based systems to electronic
information systems. 34
As electronic systems developed, courts were slow to make the
expensive and complex jump into the age of technology.35 Even
as the price of computers decreased and the understanding of
computer systems increased, electronic systems were not overly
advantageous because the data entered into a computer was
"trapped in the machine" and could not be shared electronically.36
As modem networking technologies, such as the Ethernet,
emerged in the 1980s, a court's desktop computer could be
connected to a courthouse local area network (LAN), and by the
early 1990s, courts, as much as they could afford, "were stringing
their desktop computers together with network access cards and
Ethernet wiring.,,37 This new technology allowed court Fersonnel
to access various databases running within a courthouse. 3
A problem that remained was that the systems "could not
provide a single integrated view of all the information and data
relevant to a particular case.,,39
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See infra Part II(D).
See infra Part II(E).
See infra Part II(F).
Gregory M. Silverman, Rise of the Machines: Justice Information Systems and
the Question of Public Access to Court Records over the Internet, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 175, 176 (2004).
Id. at 176-77.
/d. at 177.
Id.
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
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For example, to access the schedule for a
particular case, one might have to consult a standalone calendaring program; to check whether a
party had filed a document in that same case, a
stand-alone docketing program; and to confirm
payment of a court fee, a stand-alone accounting
program.
Before one could achieve a single,
integrated view of all the information and data
relevant to a case, one would have to not only
network all of the computers storing such
information, but integrate the programs and
information systems running on these machines as
well. 4o
While this integration is a daunting task for the courts, the
benefits of cost savings, error reduction, and improved
performance reduce the courts' overall operating expenses. 41 An
integrated, central database reduces the cost of maintaining and
changing records. 42 It also reduces the opportunity for clerical
errors that come with data entry, and court scheduling conflicts can
easily be identified and prevented. 43

B.

Maryland's Implementation of the Judicial Information
System and Its Technical Problems
In 2001, the Maryland General Assembly found a need
(1) to create a central repository for criminal
history record information; (2) to require the
reporting of accurate, relevant, and current criminal
history record information to the central repository
by all criminal justice units; (3) to ensure that
criminal history record information is kept accurate
and current; and (4) to prohibit the improper
of criminal
history
record
dissemination
information. 44

The Assembly then set out to establish "an accurate and
efficient criminal justice information system" that is consistent
with both the need for "accurate and current" criminal history
records, and the right to be free from improper and unwarranted
intrusions of privacy. 45

40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

[d. at 178-79.
[d. at 179.
[d.
[d. at 180.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-202 (West 2001).
ld. § 10-203.

Baltimore Law Review

424

IVol. 36

In order to achieve these legislative goals, the Maryland
judiciary currently operates a Judicial Information System (nS or
"the System,,).46 The JIS "staff develops and maintains State court
system applications, operates a statewide computer network, and is
responsible for data center disaster recovery capabilities.,,47 In
2004, the System operated on a $19.6 million budget. 48
The System is composed of a mainframe computer for court
applications, two mInICOmputers for traffic citations and
disbursement processing, and nine minicomputers which support
the Uniform Court System. 49 The JIS serves public customers,
Judicial Data Center personnel, and remote court users. 50 It
connects users to various units of the judiciary, including the
Circuit and District Courts, through a Wide Area Network, which
connects remote court locations to the Uniform Court System. 51
"The [Uniform Court System] supports case initiation, scheduling,
disposition, expungement and other record keeping.,,52
The System and external agencies can be accessed bl seventyseven local area networks, through the Internet. 5
These
transmissions are controlled by a central Internet firewall. 54
Additionally, the JIS "also operates a server inside its network
which supports public user dialup inquiries to court information
from approximately 5,000 paying customers.,,55
A February 2005 audit of the Maryland JIS made several
startling findings regarding the security and efficiency of the
System. The first finding was that "the internal computer network
was not sufficiently secured from untrusted networks and
monitoring of network traffic was not adequate.,,56
The second was that the maintenance and administration of the
firewall, which works to protect the System from unauthorized
access, was outdated and inadequate. 57 The third was that the JIS
communication server was not properly "configured to protect the
internal
network
from
unauthorized
modification.,,58
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Audit from Bruce A. Myers, Legislative Auditor, to Members of the Joint Audit
Comm. (Feb. 10,2005) [hereinafter JIS Audit] (on file with author), available at
http://www.ola.state.md.us/reports/Fiscal%20Compliance/JIS05.pdf.
/d. at 7.
/d.

Id.
/d.
/d.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
/d.
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"Specifically, the Systems' communication server had weak or
non-existent password and account lockout provisi~ns for server
users. In addition, authenticated users to the server were not
limited to performing only designated tasks as specified by
Systems' management."S9 ThIs flaw allowed users to access
information that they should not be privy to. 60
Fourth, the measures used to protect two important network
servers from having their aRplications improperly exposed on the
"As a result of these network
Internet were inadequate. I
vulnerabilities, these servers were not adequately secured from
exposures that could result in the loss of data integrity, the
interruption of key services, and the improper use of these
servers.,,62
Fifth, the System allowed individual users to operate under the
identity of another to gain heightened access privileges. 63 Sixth,
due to certain security inadequacies, changes to critical files "were
not subject to review and approval by supervisory personnel.,,64
This condition can easily lead to "unauthorized or erroneous
changes to mainframe data files," such as court case records. 6s
These findings were observations on the current state of the JIS,
as of February 2005, and were unrelated to the June 2005 hearing
on electronic access to court records. However, the findings are
instructive in considering that maintaining the security of
electronic court files is a difficult task amidst the imperfect and
still emerging technology of information systems.
C.

The Shift Jrom Paper to Electronic Records and Its Effect on
the Interest ojPrivacy

In addition to the technical concerns about the security of the
JIS, the development of Maryland's judicial information system
created a system of electronic judicial records, in which it is
imperative to offer heightened protection to individuals from
invasions of their privacy. 66
It is temptingly easy to assume that if one

applies the same set of rules to electronic judicial
records that was applied in the past to paper records,
59.
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
!d.
Id.at11.
!d.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and
Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 314-15
(2004).
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it will result in the same balance between the
various competing policies. Unfortunately, this is
not the case. The assumption of parity represents a
serious misunderstanding of the differences
between paper records and electronic records.
When the same rules that have been worked out for
the world of paper records are applied to electronic
records, the result does not preserve the balance
worked out between competing policies in the
world of paper records, but dramatically alters that
balance. It shifts the balance away from individual
privacy, producing little if any benefit on the side of
judicial accountability.67
There is a basic distinction between paper records and
electronic records that the Maryland General Assembly has been
slow to address in its move toward open electronic
dissemination. 68 The difference is that "practical obscurity"
existed in the traditional systems, but not in the systems that allow
electronic access. 69
While court records have always been public, the way that they
were kept allowed them to retain a high degree of "practical
obscurity.,,7o In the past, personal information found in a court
record was public in that it could be accessed by anyone, not in the
sense that it could easily be accessed by anyone with a fleeting
interest. 71 "Only those with a relatively strong interest in the
information would take time out of their day, wait in line at the
clerk's office, fill out the necessary forms, and pay the necessary
copy charges."n With the records available online, however,
anyone can access the information with incredible ease. 73
"The privacy protection that currently exists for public records
is largely designed for a world of paper records and has been slow
to adapt to an age where information can be downloaded from the
Internet in an instant." 74

67.
68.
69.

[d.at315.
But see infra Part II(F)(2).
Winn, supra note 66, at 316 (quoting United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762, 780 (1989)).

70.

[d.
[d.

71.

72.
73.

74.

[d.

Currently, criminal court records are available at http://casesearch.courts.
state.md.us/inquiry/. While this website is in its infancy and search results are
not as in-depth as they may be in the future, victim names are being disseminated
over the Internet.
Daniell. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1172 (2002).
[d.
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The Maryland Rules in Title 16, Chapter 1000, create a
heightened access to case records through electronic means, but do
not temper this with a heightened security for victims and
witnesses whose private information is included in the records. 75
While the case law on this matter is limited, the Supreme Court of
Florida, in a 2002 decision, held that "digital storage and transfer
of information changes how information can be manipulated and
retrieved. Previously obscure information can be located quickly
and anonymously for essentially no COSt.,,76 It is this inherent
difference between paper files and electronic files that raised
concerns for the Florida Supreme Court. 77
Until recently, public records were difficult to
access. For a long time, public records were only
available locally. Finding information about a
person often involved a treasure hunt around the
country to a series of local offices to dig up records.
But with the Internet revolution, public records can
be easily obtained and searched from anywhere. 78
D. Electronic Access to Public Records In Terms of Megan's Law

The inherent privacy issue that is attached to the Internet
dissemination of public records was extrapolated in the passage
and implementation of Megan's Law. 79
The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Act "conditions certain federal law
enforcement funding on the States' adoption of sex offender
registration laws and sets mimmum standards for state
programs.,,80 These registration laws are known as Megan's Laws;
by 1996 every state and the District of Columbia had enacted some
form of Megan's Law. 8l
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court examined Alaska's
variation of Megan's Law. 82 Alaska's version of the law requires
that a sex offender register with local law enforcement authorities,
providing "his name, aliases, identifying features, address, place of
75.
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.

See infra note 127.
In re Report & Recommendations of the Judicial Mgmt. Council of Fla. on
Privacy & Elec. Access to Court Records, 832 So. 2d 712, 714 (Fla. 2002).
/d.
Solove, supra note 74, at 1139.
See infra discussion accompanying notes 89-96.
42 U.S.C. § l4071(g)(2)(A) (2006); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89-90 (2003).
Smith, 538 U.S. at 89-90. The laws are named for "Megan Kanka[,] a sevenyear-old New Jersey girl who was sexually assaulted and murdered in 1994 by a
neighbor who, unknown to the victim's family, had prior convictions for sex
offenses against children." [d. at 89.
/d. at 90.
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employment, date of birth, conviction information, driver's license
number, information about vehicles to which he has access, and
postconviction treatment history.,,83 Those who fail to comply
with these regulations are subject to criminal prosecution. 84
The information provided is maintained in a central registry for
sex offenders and is made available to the pUblic. 85 "The Act does
not specify the means by which the registry information must be
made public. Alaska has chosen to make most of the nonconfidential information available on the Internet.,,86
In Smith v. Doe, two men were separately convicted of sex
offenses. After completing rehabilitative programs, they were
required to submit personal information to the state for the purpose
of the sex offender registry. 87 Among other things, the men argued
that the widespread dissemination of their conviction was punitive
and for the purpose of further humiliation. 88
In an amicus brief, the Electronic Privacy Information Center 89
(EPIC) argued that
The Alaska Megan's Law statute permits
internet dissemination of stigmatizing information
collected from released offenders by the state by
mandating that the information in the registry be
available "for any purpose . . . to any person."
Because government posting of registry information
makes this information widely available to
individuals not living in geographic proximity to the
registrant, the punishment imposed by the statute is
excessive. 9o
While the amicus concedes that society has the ability to limit
the privacy rights of criminals, it argues that the restrictions should
not be more invasive than is necessary to achieve the state's
purpose. 91 Widespread Internet dissemination goes beyond the
purpose of locally identifying community sex offenders. 92

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

90.
91.

92.

Id. (construing ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.01O(a)-(b) (2004)).
Id. (construing ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.835-.840 (2004)).
Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id. at 97.
"[EPIC] is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C. that was
established to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to
protect privacy, the First Amendment, and other constitutional values." Brief for
Electronic Privacy Information Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 1, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (No. 01-729), 2002 WL 1822146.
!d. at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2-3.
See id. at 7-10.

Electronic Access to Court Records

2007)

429

The Supreme Court addressed this contention and held that
"[w ]idespread public access is necessary for the efficacy of the
scheme" and "[t]he fact that Alaska posts the information on the
Internet does not alter [this] conclusion.,,93
The Court's reasoning, however, rested on the fact that there
was a compelling state interest in making public the information of
sex offenders. 94 Public safety was more heavily weighted in a
balancing test with the encroachment on the privacy of the
offenders. 95
Conversely, in the case of the dissemination of the private
information of victims and witnesses, it is difficult to envision a
similar outcome in the balancing between the safety and privacy of
victims and the government incentive of judicial ease.
Victims and witnesses are distinguishable from the criminally
convicted in that the state does not have the right to limit their
privacy and there is no overriding government interest in making
their whereabouts known to the public. 96
E.

Other Jurisdictions

Some jurisdictions have recognized the problematic nature of
the electronic dissemination of victim and witness information and
have adjusted their rules accordingly.97
1.

Minnesota

Rule Eight of the Minnesota Rules of Public Access to Records
of the Judicial Branch deals with the issue of electronic access. 98
Subsection One of the Rule allows open access to public records in
the courthouse. 99 Subsection Two addresses the "remote access to
electronic records."IOO It specifies that "a custodian that maintains
the following electronic case records must provide remote

93.
94.
95.

96.

97.
98.
99.

100.

Smith, 538 U.S. at 99.
See id.
See id.
See Stacy R. Horth-Neubert, In the Hot Box and on the Tube: Witnesses Interests
in Televised Trials, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 166-67 & n.7 (1997); Kimberly A.
Murphy, Comment, The Use of Federal Writs of Habeas Corpus to Release the
Obligation to Report Under State Sex Offender Statutes: Are Defendants "In
Custody" for Purposes of Habeas Corpus Review?, 2000 MICH. ST. LREV. 513,
passim (2000).
See discussion infra Part II(E)(1)-(3).
Minn. R. Pub. Access to Records of the Jud. Br., R. 8 (2005).
Id. at 8.1 ("Upon request to a custodian, a person shall be allowed to inspect or to
obtain copies of original versions of records that are accessible to the public in
the place where such records are normally kept, during regular working hours.").
Id. at 8.2.
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electronic access to those records to the extent that the custodian
has the resources and technical capacity to do SO."IOI
The rule goes on to make the following exceptions:
Notwithstanding Rule 8, subd. 2(a), the public
shall not have remote access to the following data in
an electronic case record with regard to parties or
their family members, jurors, witnesses, or victims
of a criminal or delinquent act: (1) social security
numbers and employer identification numbers; (2)
street addresses; (3) telephone numbers; (4)
financial account numbers; and (5) in the cases of a
juror, witness, or victim of a criminal or delinquent
act, information that either specifically identifies the
individual or from which the identity of the
individual could be ascertained. 102
The rule defines remote access as "information in a court record
[that] can be electronically searched, inspected, or copied without
the need to physically visit a court facility." 103
The language of the rule makes clear that the state of Minnesota
has recognized the distinction between the ability to access court
records from afar on the Internet and from being forced to
physically visit the courthouse to obtain information found in court
records, and has tempered this difference with limited access to online records. 104
2.

Colorado

On April 8, 2005, the Colorado Judicial Department adopted a
new policy regarding the public's access to court records. 1O The
policy came after "[a] Public Access Committee was established
... to develop policy regarding the information to be released to
the public from court records including court records maintained in
the Integrated Colorado Online Network ... system." 106
The Colorado policy, like the Minnesota Rules, defines remote
access as "the ability to electronically search, inspect, or copy
information in a court record without the need to physically visit
the Judiciary Branch facility or location where the court record is
maintained." 107
10 1.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 8.2(a).
ld. at 8.2(b).
ld. at 8.2(d).
See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
Colo. Judicial Dep't, Public Access to Court Records (Apr. 8,2005).
ld. § 3.00(a).
ld. § 3.30.
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According to the policy, court records are assumed to be subject
to remote access, except as otherwise specified. lOS The judiciary
makes very clear in its list of specifications that certain types of
information will not be open to the public by any means. 109 It also
specifies what types of information will be available at the
courthouse, but not through remote access. 110
Most specifically, information regarding victims and witnesses
is only available at the courthouse, not through remote access. III
3.

Wisconsin

The Wisconsin court system employs a system called
Wisconsin Circuit Court Access (WCCA) which, in conjunction
with the Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP),
allows public Internet access to court records. I 12 The disclosure
policy governs the privacy of victims, witnesses and jurors by
recommending "that court personnel entering information
concerning crime victims into court documents use initials and
dates of birth rather than full names whenever doing so would not
defeat the purpose of the court document." 113
The Wisconsin policy is different from Colorado's and
Minnesota's in that it does not protect victims and witnesses by
removing their personal information from court records. I 14
However, the policy states that court personnel should avoid
entering information that is not necessary to the purpose of the
court record. I 15 While this approach leaves open the possibility for
108.
109.

llO.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

I IS.

Id. § 4.20.
Id. § 4.60(a). These records that are not open to the public include:
Probation [ ] files, Social Security Numbers (as collected by the court
on court issued or standardized forms), Deposited Wills, Victim's
name or identifying information in sexual assault case[s],
Drug/Alcohol treatment information, Paternity tests, cases and
records, Genetic testing, HIV/ AIDS testing information, Medical,
mental health sociological, intelligence testing, Scholastic
achievement data on individuals, Adoption Records, Relinquishment
Cases, Juvenile Delinquency Cases, Dependency & Neglect Records,
Mental Health Cases, Expunged Records, Sealed files, data or
information, Files/field/codes concerning the deliberative process,
Draft opinions, notes or internal memos, Driver History, Judicial
bypass cases, Juror questionnaires, CBI criminal background check
reports.
Id.
Id. § 4.60(b). The personal information of the crime victims is not available in
electronic format. Id.
Id.
Wisc. Policy on Disclosure of Public Information Over the Internet,
http://wcca.wicourts.gov/AB0304.xsl (last visited Dec. 30, 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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error by court personnel, it still recognizes the vulnerability and
importance of the privacy of victims and witnesses. 116
F.

Maryland Rules

Title 16, Chapter 1000, of the Maryland Rules is the applicable
authority in terms of guarding the personal information of victims
and witnesses from electronic dissemination. 117
Rule 16-1001 defines a court record as "( 1) an administrative
record; (2) a business license record; (3) a case record; or (4) a
notice record." 118 This Comment is focused on case records,
which are "document[s], information, or other thing[s] that [are]
collected, received, or maintained by a court in connection with
one or more specific judicial actions or proceedings." 119 More
narrowly, this Comment is concerned with the telephone numbers
and addresses of victims and witnesses which are included in case
records as a matter of course. 120
As a ?:eneral policy, these rules provide a presumption of "openness. 21
However, Rule 16-1005 allows the following
exceptions:
[A] custodian shall deny inspection of a case record
or any part of a case record if inspection would be
contrary to:
(1) The Constitution of the United States, a Federal
statute, or a Federal regulation adopted under a
Federal statute and having the force of law;

(2) The Maryland Constitution;
(3) A provision of the Maryland Public Information
Act that is expressly adopted in the Rules in this
Chapter;
(4) A rule adopted by the Court of Appeals; or
(5) An order entered by the court having custody of
the case record or by any higher court having
jurisdiction over
(A) the case record, or
(B) the person seeking inspection of the case
record. 122
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See generally supra notes 114-115.
MD. R. 16-1001 to -1009.
MD. R. 16-1001.
Id.
Letter from Roberta Roper, supra note 2.
MD. R. 16-1002.
MD. R. 16-1005.
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The Rules also specify certain categories of case records which
carry an automatic prohibition of inspection. 123 These categories
include adoption and guardianship actions, certain delinquency
hearings, certain records pertaining to a marriage license, any case
records concerning child abuse or neglect, confidential attorney
grievance matters, and Pro Bono Legal Service Reports. 124
Additionally, in criminal actions, various types of information,
including expunged records, certain records pertaining to search
and arrest warrants, records of spousal privilege, records
containing certain medical information, and records of income tax
returns carry a required denial of inspection. 125
Rule 16-1007 further denies the inspection of specific
information in case records if the inspection would reveal:
(a) The name, address, telephone number, email address, or place of employment of a person
who reports the abuse of a vulnerable adult. . .. (b)
. . . the home address or telephone number of an
employee of the State or a political subdivision of
the State. (c) Any part of the social security or
Federal Identification Number of an individual,
other than the last four digits. (d) Information about
a person who has received a copy of a sex
offender's or sexual predator's registration
statement. 126
Rule 16-1008 states that "a court record that is kept in electronic
form is open to inspection to the same extent that the record would
be open to inspection in paper form." 127 The Rule further specifies
that, for the purpose of providing electronic access to court
records, including case records, the court is authorized
(A) to convert paper court records into electronic
court records; (B) to create new electronic records,
databases, programs, or computer systems; (C) to
provide computer terminals or other equipment for
use by the public; (D) to create the ability to inspect
or copy court records through remote access; or (E)
to convert, supplement, modify, or replace an
existing electronic storage or retrieval system. 128

123.

MD. R. 16-1006.

124.
125.

Id.
Id.

126.
127.
128.

MD. R. 16-1007.
MD. R. 16-1008(a)(l).
MD. R. 16-1008(a)(2).
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The Rule also defines remote access as the availability to the
public throu§h "dial-up modem, web site access, or other
technology." 1 9
1.

Recently Adopted Amendments to the Maryland Rules

In its One Hundred Fifty-Sixth Report to the Court of
Appeals, the Rules Committee proposed amendments to Rule 161008. 130 "The proposed amendments to Rule 16-1008 limit remote
access to identifying information of victims and nonparty
The Rules Committee also
witnesses in criminal cases." 131
recommended that the amendments be adopted immediately so that
the rule would become effective before the identifying information
could be posted on the Internet. 132
The amendments, which were approved by the Court of
Appeals on March 7, 2006, and are to go into effect on July 1,
2006, add the following provision to Rule 16-1008:
Except for identifying information relating to
law enforcement officers, other public officials
acting in their official capacity, and expert
witnesses, a custodian shall prevent remote access
to the address, telephone number, date of birth, email address, and place of employment of a victim
or nonparty witness in (1) a criminal action. 133
This amendment limits the remote access of victim and witness
information by making the rule subject to specific, limiting
language. 134
This amendment followed consideration of "the request of the
Maryland Crime Victims' Resource Center, Inc. and the Maryland
State's Attorneys Association." 135
The Reporter's Note
summarized the reasoning:
Victims' representatives and prosecutors fear
that remote access to VIctIm and witness
information in criminal cases would facilitate and
increase the ease with which a person from
anywhere in the world, using an internet search
engine, could harass, harm, intimidate, stalk, or
threaten victims and witnesses. The criminal justice
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

MD. R. 16-1008(a)(4)(B).
32 Md. Reg. 1819 (Nov. 14,2005).
ld. at 1820.
ld.
33-7 Md. Reg. 620, 621 (Mar. 31, 2006).
!d.

32 Md. Reg. 1821 (Reporter's Note).
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system would be harmed by an increase in the
already significant reluctance of victims and
witnesses to report crimes and testify. Remote
access would have a chilling effect on the reporting
of rape and other crimes if a victim can forever be
identified and stigmatized as a ra~e victim by a
simple name search on the internet. 1 6
The amendments take the same route as Minnesota rules and
Colorado policy, by protecting victims and witnesses from having
their
addresses
and
telephone
numbers
disseminated
electronically. I37
2.

Proposed Legislation

In addition to these amendments to the Court Rules, during the
2006 Legislative Session, Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. proposed
legislation that would limit electronic access to victim and witness
information. 138 Along with the Governor's Bill, Senator Norman
R. Stone, Jr. and Delegate Joseph F. Vallario, sponsored similar
bills to protect victim and witness information from electronic
dissemination. 139 While each of these Bills failed,140 they were
proposed to prevent electronic access to public records that contain
the personal information of victims and witnesses. 141
Like the proposed amendments to the Maryland Rules, these
Bills were limited to protecting victim and witness information
from electronic access. 142 However, the problem goes beyond
remote access. 143 The larger issue is that the heavy burden of
limiting what information is included in the court record falls upon
the victims. 144 Forthcoming proposed rule changes should not
only protect victims and witnesses from improper remote access,

136.
137.
138.
139.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

[d.

See discussion supra Part II(E)(l)-(2).
Daniel Ostrovsky, Bill Would Block Access to Some Court Records, THE DAILY
REC., Jan. 31,2006, at lB.
H.D. 632, 2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006) (withdrawn), available at
http://mlis.state.md.us/2006rs/billfilelhb0632.htm; H.D. 323, 2006 Leg., 421 st
Sess. (Md. 2006) (Senate took no action after Apr. 6, 2006), available at
http://m1is.state.md.us/2006rs/billfilelhb0323.htm; S. 232, 2006 Leg., 421 st Sess.
(Md. 2006) (Senate took no action after Jan. 31, 2006; House took no action),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2006rs/billfile/sb0232.htm; S. 162,2006 Leg.,
421 st Sess. (Md. 2006) (Senate took no action after Jan. 31, 2006; House took no
action), available at http://m1is.state.md.us/2006rs/billfile/sbOI62.htm. The
differences between these bills are immaterial to the scope of this Comment.
See supra note 139.
!d.
[d.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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but also from traditional courthouse access to their personal
infonnation. 145
III. THE"REGULATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS
This section will first examine the regulation of public records
through a discussion of how public records were examined at
common law,146 and how the passage of the Freedom of
Infonnation Act affected the open examination of co~rt records. 147
Next, it will examine the jurisprudence of striking a balance
between public access and privacy.148 It will follow with a
discussion of legislation passed to protect personal infonnation that
had become public through state departments of motor vehicles. 149
It will conclude with a discussion of Maryland's laws concerning
public access to court records, including the applicable discovery
rules. 150
A.

Common Law

Following English common law, early u.S. courts n6nnally
only granted access to non-court records where there was a special
interest. 151 "Today, however, this discretion has been significantly
reduced by state and federal freedom of infonnation laws." 152
More specifically, the public's ability to inspect court records
has traditionally been open and includes "a general right to inspect
and copy public records and documents, including judicial records
and documents." 153
The Supreme Court has, however, provided discretion to the
court to protect privacy in court files by holding that "[i]t is
uncontested ... that the right to inspect and copy judicial records is
not absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own
records and files and access has been denied where court files
might have become a vehicle for improper purposes." 154

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See infra Part IV.
Infra Part III(A).
Infra Part Ill(B).
Infra Part III(C).
Infra Part Ill(D).
Infra Part III(E).
Solove, supra note 74, at 1155.
Id. at 1156.
Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Solove, supra note
74, at 1156.
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
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Despite this discretion, the presumption is in favor of open
access to court records. 155 This places a burden on the party
seeking confidentiality. 156
B.

The Freedom of Information Act

In 1966, the passage of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), and the similar state legislation that followed, created a
"strong commitment to openness and transparency.,,157 "The
Freedom of Information Act of 1966 ... provides that Government
agencies shall make available to the public a broad spectrum of
information." 158
The FOIA was passed to tighten uR ambiguities that existed
under the previo·us applicable statute. I 9 "The provisions of the
Freedom of Information Act stand in sharp relief against those of
[the former statute]." 160 The FOIA was "plainly intended to set up
concrete, workable standards for determining whether particular
material may be withheld or must be disclosed." 161
The FOIA made all public records as open as court records had
been under the common law. 162 The basic congressional purpose
of the Act was to reflect "a general philosophy of full agency
disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated
statutory language.,,163 Its effect on access to court records was to
This rsresumption
codify the presumption of openness. 164
continues today and is evident in the Maryland Rules. I 5

155.

156.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Solove, supra note 74, at 1158 (citing United States v. EI-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158,
159 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the public has a presumptive right of access to
court records); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3d Cir. 1994)
(same); SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1993) (same);
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d I, 13 (1st Cir. 1986) (same).
Solove, supra note 74, at 1158 (citing FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830
F.2d 404, 408-11 (I st Cir. 1987) ("[T]hose seeking to keep the datum hidden
from view ... must carry the devoir of persuasion.")).
Solove, supra note 74, at 1161.
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 74 (1973), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Jd. at 79.
Jd.
Jd.
See id.
S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965).
Jd.
See infra notes 210-217.
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C.

The Balance Between Privacy and Public Access

1.

The Supreme Court has Held that Privacy Outweighs Public
Access

Despite the general presumption of openness, "[t]he Supreme
Court has consistently found that the right to privacy outweighs the
public's right to access.,,166 In United States Department ofJustice
v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,167 the Court
held that the disclosure of an FBI rap-sheet to a third party, was an
unwarranted invasion of privacy of the subject of the rap-sheet. 168
The rationale hinged on the existence of specific statutory and
regulatory provisions that limit the public access to rap-sheet
information. 169 The Court explained that "[t]his careful and
limited pattern of authorized rap-sheet disclosure evidenced a
congressional intent to protect the privacy of the rap-sheet
subjects." 170
This case indicates that the Court will carefully balance privacy
Furthermore, the
and openness on a case-by-case basis. 171
Supreme Court has stressed the limitations of openness when
sensitive personal information is at issue. 172
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Supreme
Court made the distinction that President Nixon had a privacy
interest in records of his communications with his family, but not
in records of his official duties. 173
In framing th[ e] balance [between public access
and the privacy rights of individuals], courts are
sensitive to protect not only the personal privacy of
litigants, but also the harm that can come to others,
such as witnesses, victims, jurors, and other third
parties, who may have no control over the
information so disclosed. 174

166.

167.
168.
169.
170.

171.
172.
173.
174.

Victoria S. Salzmann, Are Public Records Really Public?: The Collision Between
the Right to Privacy and the Release of Public Court Records Over the Internet,
52 BAYLOR L. REV. 355, 363 (2000).
489 U.S. 749 (1989).
ld. at 780.
!d. at 764-65.
ld. at 765.
!d.
See, e.g., infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
Winn, supra note 66, at 312.
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Westinghouse Factors

In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United States,175 an
employer, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, sought to
protect its employees' medical records from being examined by the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.176 The
court attempted to balance the interest of maintaining occupational
safety and health and the privacy of employees. 177 Five factors
were laid out for consideration in the balance between personal
privacy and the governmental interest in the disclosure of health
records. 178
The factors which should be considered in
deciding whether an intrusion into an individual's
privacy is justified are the types of records
requested, the information it does or might contain,
the potential for harm in any subsequent
non consensual disclosure, the Injury from
disclosure to the relationship in which the record
was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to
prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need
for access, and whether there is an express statutory
mandate, articulated public policy, or other
recognizable public interest militating toward
access. 179
The court held that the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health should be allowed access to the medical records,
assuming that the employees were given reasonable notice and an
opportunity to object. 180 Courts have subsequently applied the
Westinghouse factors in deciding whether the disclosure of
personal health information is appropriate. 181
The examination of the balancing of privacy and the interest in
inspecting medical records is instructive because it is comparable
to the balance that is made between privacy and the inspection of
court records. 182
Professor Winn has summarized the balance between privacy
and public access as follows:
175.

638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).

176.

ld. at 572.

177.

ld.

178.
179.
180.

ld. at 578.
ld.
!d. at 582.

181.

Winn, supra note 66, at 313 (citing Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp.
376,378,382 (D.N.I. 1990); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.O. Wis.
1988), ajJ'd without opinion, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990)).
ld.

182.
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The pragmatic reasons supporting the need for
public access ... are typically balanced against the
pragmatic reasons supporting the need to restrict
public access.
While courts are vigilant in
protecting the public right of access when it is
consistent with ensuring the credibility of the
judicial system, they are also quick to protect
individuals from the exploitation of their personal
information when it bears little relationship to
ensuring the integrity of the judicial process. This
common law and constitutional balance, carefully
worked out on a case-by-case basis over the course
of many years, represents the finest form of judicial
lawmaking. 183
3.

Solove's Paradigm

Professor Solove argues that the overarching problem in this
area of law is what he refers to as the "secrecy paradigm." 184 This
traditional concept of privacy revolves around secrecy and the idea
that once information is disclosed, the privacy is IOSt.1 85 This
model is embedded in our culture, as privacy is "often represented
visually by a roving eye, an open keyhole, or a person peeking
through Venetian blinds. Further, this paradigm explains why the
Big Brother metaphor has become so widely used for depicting
privacy problems." 186
This paradigm has greatly influenced privacy law. 187 For
example, in Fourth Amendment analyses the Supreme Court has
held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in situations
where something could have been seen or heard in public, or by a
third person. 188
183.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

/d. at 313-14.
Solove, supra note 74, at 1176.
/d.
/d. at 1177.
/d.
[d. (citing Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding
that "the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from
navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment" due to
the fact that the images are generally available to public view»; but see Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001) (holding that thermal imaging technology
that allows insight into the home, into information that is not generally in public
view is a violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in
curbside garbage because it was made public to the trash collectors); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in a pen register because the information is made public to phone
company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in bank records because they are made public to the
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The law treats prIvacy in a black-and-white manner,
categorizing information as either wholly public or wholly
private. 189 If information remains a secret, it will remain private,
but once information becomes public, it will enter the public
domain, will be available for any use, and can no longer be
claimed to be private. 190
While Professor So love urges a retreat from the traditional
paradigm," the courts have been slow to make such a
move. I I As the professor points out, in Scheetz v. Morning Cali,
Inc., the court upheld the disclosure of a police report, alleging
spousal abuse, to the press, despite the fact that no charges had
been filed and that the married couple sought to keep the
information private. 192 The court reasoned that "[t]he police could
have brought charges without her concurrence, at which point all
the information would have wound up on the public record, where
it would have been non-confidential." 193
"secrec~

The case law indicates that once personal information becomes
public, or even could become public, it will rarely be
constitutionally protected by the right to privacy. 194 Therefore,
victim and witness information, once it becomes available in the
public court record, according to the secrecy paradigm, will never
be considered private again.
D. Protection oj Personal InJormation in Terms oj the Driver's
Privacy Act
A major problem with the lack of privacy and the increased ease
of access is that the personal information of victims and witnesses
being disseminated, can and will be used for the purpose of
intimidation or harassment. 195 The increased access that comes
with electronic access can directly "facilitate blackmail, extortion,

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

195.

bank), limited by statute on other grounds as stated in Hancock v. Marshall, 86
F.R.D. 209 (D.D.C. 1980).
Solove, supra note 74, at 1177.
Id.
Id.
Id.
/d.
Id.

at 1182, 1184.
at 1182 (citing Scheetz v. Morning Call Inc., 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991)).
(quoting Scheetz, 946 F.2d at 207).
(citing Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that "one's
criminal history is arguably not a 'private personal' matter at all, since arrest and
conviction information are matters of public record"); Doe v. City of New York,
15 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1994) ("An individual cannot expect to have a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in matters of public record.")).
See supra text accompanying notes 5-10. Professor Winn discusses the
commercialization of the personal information found in court records as a major
concern that comes with electronic dissemination. Winn, supra note 66, at 316.
While this concern is the crux of many arguments against a shift from paper
records, it is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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stalking, sexual assault, subornation of perjury, identity theft, and
fraud." 196
Personal infonnation is the most sensitive and the most likely to
be subject to misuse. 197 In tenns of public court records, the
personal infonnation that is of great concern to victims' rights
advocates are the addresses and telephone numbers of the victims
and witnesses who are named in the public record. 198
In 1994, Congress addressed the issue of hann being facilitated
Congress
by infonnation gathered from public records. 199
considered a highly publicized case in which the actress Rebecca
Shaeffer was shot and killed by a person who obtained her address
through the California Department of Motor Vehicles. 200 In the
House, there was a discussion of gangs who took license plate
numbers of expensive cars, found out the addresses of the car
owners through the DMV and robbed the houses. 201 In the Senate,
there was an account of a California man who sent threatening
letters to young women after using their license plate numbers to
obtain their addresses from the DMV.202
These cases involved infonnation culled from public records at
state departments of motor vehicles and led to the passage of the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994. 203 However, the exact
same infonnation, an individual's name and address, could have
just as easily been obtained from court records. 204 "Personal
infonnation that facilitates these kinds of wrongs should not be
accessible to the public either at the courthouse or over the
Internet.
It places an individual in jeopardy of physical,
psychological, and economic hann without furthering any of the
benefits of public access to court records.,,205
The purpose of public access to the court system is multifaceted. There is a government interest in promoting public trust
and confidence in the court system and showing that the nation's
laws are being upheld and enforced. 206 There is also an interest in
educating citizens and keeping the public infonned as to how the
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Silvennan, supra note 32, at 206.
Id. at 207.
See Silvennan, supra note 32, at 207; Letter from Roberta Roper, supra note 2.
Silvennan, supra note 32, at 207-08.
139 CONGo REC. 27, 327 (1993) (statement of Rep. Moran); Silvennan, supra
note 32, at 207-08.
139 CONGo REC. 27, 327 (1993) (statement of Rep. Moran); Silvennan, supra
note 32, at 207.
139 CONGo REc. 29,466 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer); Silvennan, supra note
32, at 207.
Silvennan, supra note 32, at 208.
Id.
/d. at 208-09.
Id. at 209.
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courts operate and what conclusions the courts have reached on the
issues before them. 207
Withholding sensitive personal information from
the public when they access court records will
neither undermine nor subvert any of these benefits.
The adjudicatory facts upon which a court relies to
dispose of a case or controversy according to the
rule of law need never include the specific,
arbitrarily assigned street address of a person's
home, the precise series of numerals composing his
or her telephone number, or the exact digits of his
or her Social Security number. That a person has a
Social Security number may be relevant to the just
and rational disposition of a case, but the specific
number will not be.
Similarly, the general
education that an individual might be expected to
acquire from the perusal of court records does not
include committing to memory the street addresses
of fellow citizens, their Social Security numbers, or
their bank accounts. Accordingly, such information
should be omitted from publicly accessible court
records and documents, irrespective of their form or
the public's method of accessing them. 208

E.

Current Applicable Maryland Provisions

1.

Rule 16-1009-Preliminary Shielding Upon Motion

Rule 16-1009 applies to court records irrespective of whether
they are being accessed electronically or at the courthouse. 209
Rule 16-1009 allows the court to deny the inspection of case
records on a case-by-case basis. 2lo For the court to review a
request for a denial of inspection of a case record, a motion must
be filed by "[a] party to an action in which a case record is filed,
including a person who has been permitted to intervene as a party,
and a person who is the subject of or is specifically identified in a
case record.,,211 Under this rule, a victim or witness who is named
in a case record must file a motion which must be served on all
parties to the action, if she wishes to have her address and
telephone number kept out of the public court record. 212 After the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
!d. at 209-10.
See MD. R. 16-1008(a), 16-1009.
MD. R. 16-1009.
MD. R. 16-1009(a)(l).
MD. R. 16-1009(a)(2).
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victim files the motion, the record will be preliminarily shielded
for five business days while the court determines whether or not to
issue a temporary order precluding or limiting inspection. 213 This
temporary order. will be .issued when an affidavit or statement
under oath indicates that:
(A) there is a substantial basis for believing that
the case record is properly subject to an order
precluding or limiting inspection, and (B)
immediate, substantial, and irreparable harm will
result to the person seeking the relief if temporary
relief is not granted before a full adversary hearing
can be held on the propriety of a final order
precluding or limiting inspection. 214
Following the issuance of the temporary order and a full
adversary hearing, the court may issue a fmal order. 215 In making
the determination of whether to issue a final order, the court shall
consider anl "special or compelling reason[ s]" to limit
inspection. 21 Under the Rules, a heavy burden rests on a person
identified in the case record who wishes to have his personal
information removed from the public record. 217 Additionally, this
person carries the burden of acquiring information about the rights
afforded to victims and witnesses and the possibility of having
personal information shielded fr()m the public record. 218
2.

Amendment to Rule 16-1009-Shielding Upon Request

In July 2006, the Maryland Court of Appeals amended Rule 161009, allowing victims of domestic violence and victims who have
acquired peace orders to have their information shielded upon
"request," without filing a motion. 219 If the victim's request is
granted, the shield on the personal information will remain "in
effect until terminated or modified by order of court. If the request
is denied, the person seeking to shield information may file a
motion .... ,,226 A criminal witness or victim who is not a victim
of domestic violence or who has not obtained a peace order must
continue to file a motion, and will be unaffected by the July 2006
Amendment. 221

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

MD. R. 16-1009(b).
MD. R. 16-1009(c)(2).
MD. R. 16-1009(d).
MD. R. 16-1009(d)(4).
MD. R. 16-1009(d).
See generally Eveleth, supra note II, at I.
33 Md. Reg. 1433 (Aug. 18,2006).
[d.
!d.
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The Amendment to Rule 16-1009 makes it easier for certain
victims to ask the court t.o shield their personal information from
the public record, without going through the tedious process of
filing a motion. 222 It also continues to place the burden on victims
to take certain statutory steps in order to have their personal
information withheld from the public record.
3.

Discovery Rules and the Coleman Case

Coleman v. State 223 is a case involving drug-related crimes. 224
"The case demonstrates the dominant extent to which the rampant
illicit dealings in drugs have intruded, both flagrantly and
insidiously, into the life of the community and the lives of the
people.,,215
.

The defendants in the case appealed the trial court's decision to
withhold, from the defendants, the names of the prosecution's key
witnesses. 226 The names of the witnesses were withheld because
this was a classic case of witness intimidation. 227 The applicable
rule of discovery in this case is Rule 4-263(b)(1) which states that
"upon the request of the defendant, the State's Attorney shall ...
[d]isclose to the defendant the name and address of each person
then known whom the State intends to call as a witness.,,228
The broad exception to this rule is that the State is not required
to disclose any "matter if the court finds that its disclosure would
entail a substantial risk of harm to any person outweighing the
interest in disclosure.,,229 In Coleman, the Court of Appeals used
this exception to uphold the trial court's decision to withhold the
witness information from the defendants. 23o
"The privilege of the State to withhold certain matters from
defendants in criminal causes has long been recognized, not only
in Maryland but throughout the country. The privilege is
especially important in the enforcement of narcotic laws, since it is
most difficult to obtain evidence for prosecutions.,,231 In this
particular case, the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge did
not abuse her discretion when she did not allow the defendants
discovery of the witness information. 232 The reasoning was that
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

[d.
321 Md. 586, 583 A.2d 1044 (1991).
[d. at 589, 583 A.2d at 1045.
[d. at 589, 583 A.2d at 1045.
[d. at 591; 583 A.2d at 1046.
[d. at 595-96, 583 A.2d at 1048.
MD. R. 4-263(b)(1).
MD. R. 4-263(c)(3).
Coleman, 321 Md. at 604,583 A.2d at 1052.
[d. at 602, 583 A.2d at 1051 (citations omitted).
[d. at 603, 583 A.2d at 1052.
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the safety of the witnesses outweighed the rights of the defendants
to have access to the names and addresses of the witnesses. 233
This case indicates that once the names and addresses of
witnesses become an issue, the burden will be on the defendants to
show that their interest in obtaining the information outweighs the
interest in keeping the information closed from discovery. 234
However, in order to become an issue, the first and most important
burden is on the victim or the witness to request that the
information be protected from discovery and withheld from the
court record. 235
The discovery rules and the Coleman case must be considered
together with Section 11-205 of the Maryland Code of Criminal
Procedure.
4.

Sections 11-205 and 11-301 of the Maryland Code of Criminal
Procedure

The victim's burden is further cemented in sections 11-205 and
11-301 of the Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure. 236 Section
11-205 deals with requests made prior to trial. 237 The section
states that:
On request of the State, a victim of or witness to
a felony or delinquent act that would be a felony if
committed by an adult, or a victim's representative,
a judge, State's Attorney, District Court
commissioner, intake officer, or law enforcement
officer may withhold the address or telephone
number of the victim, victim's representative, or
witness before the trial or adjudicatory hearing in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding, unless a judge
determines that good cause has been shown for the
release of the information. 238
Similarly, section 11-301 deals with motions made during a
trial. 239

233.
234.
235.

236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
See supra notes 228-229.
See supra note 231. In Coleman, the State made the request to withhold the
witness information because of the obvious witness intimidation aspect of the
case. Id. It is in situations where witness or victim privacy is not evident to the
prosecutor that the burden falls solely on the shoulders of the witnesses and
victims to see to it that their personal information is withheld from the public
record.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 11-205, 11-301 (West 2005).
Id. § 11-205.
Id.
Id. § 11-301.
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On motion of the State or on request of a victim
or witness, during a criminal trial or a juvenile
delinquency adjudicatory hearing, a court may
prohibit the release of the address or telephone
number of the victim or witness unless the court
determines that good cause is shown for the release
of the information. 240
While these sections give the court the discretion to withhold
victim and witness information, the discretion is not triggered until
241
As a practical matter, this places the burden
a request is made.
on the victims or witnesses to proactively prevent their personal
information from becoming a part of the public court record.
Although the statutes and discovery rules indicate that once victim
and witness information is of issue before the court, the burden
will shift to the defendant to show why the information should be
in the record, the first burden is on the victim or witness to seek
advice as to his rights and then to make the appropriate request. 242
IV. SOLUTION-SHIFTING THE BURDEN
The Maryland Code, in conjunction with Maryland Rule 161009, shows that the addresses and telephone numbers of victims
and witnesses are presumed to be open to the public. 243 The
Maryland Rules also indicate that with the advent of new
technologies this information will be available electronically from
remote locations. 244
While the Rules Committee has adopted amendments that
would limit the electronic availability of victim and witness
information, and that allow victims and witnesses to request to
have their information shielded, it has done nothing to remedy the
root of the problem. The basic burden is still placed on the victims
or witnesses to have their personal information blocked from the
public record. 245
Electronic access to victim and witness telephone numbers and
addresses is simply a publicized mutation of a larger problem of
general public access to this information. In order to solve the
problem, the legislature should go beyond the approach taken by
the amendments to the Rules and the proposed legislation. While
these solutions narrowly protect victims and witnesses from remote
access problems, they should give the victims and witnesses broad
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

!d.
Id. §§ 11-205, 11-301.
Id.; supra Part lIl(E); see generally Eveleth, supra note II, at I.
Supra note 121.
Supra note 127.
See supra Part lIl(E).
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protection by placing the burden on the defendant to show why the
personal information is vital to the court record.
This goal can be accomplished by changing the language of
sections 11-205 and 11-301. Both sections currently state that the
addresses and telephone numbers of victims and witnesses "may"
be withheld from the court record upon request. 246 This wording
places the burden on the innocent victim or witness to see to it that
information be withheld. 247 As most victims and witness are not
represented by counsel, it is unrealistic to assume that innocent
people who find themselves in the middle of the criminal justice
system, as non-parties, will have the knowledge to request that
their personal information be withheld from the record. As the
system stands, the addresses and telephone numbers of
unrepresented victims and witnesses are being disseminated in the
court record due to the fact that the citizenry is not aware of the
need to make the appropriate requests.
The burden must be shifted away from the unrepresented nonparties to defendants who often have a Constitutional right to be
represented by counsel. Sections 11-205 and 11-301 should be
replaced with a statute that reads:
On motion of the defendant, prior to or during a
criminal trial or a juvenile delinquency adjudicatory
hearing, a court may permit the release of the
address or telephone number of the victim or
witness if the court determines that good cause is
shown for the release of the information.
This proposal creates a presumption that victim or witness
addresses and telephone numbers will not be a part of the court
record. It does not disturb a defendant's right to confrontation, as
the victims' and witnesses' names will remain part of the court
record. The only aspects of the record that would be withheld are
the actual numbers that constitute the victims' or witnesses'
telephone numbers and street addresses. The benefit of this
withholding will be increased privacy for the innocent third parties
who are neither defendants nor prosecutors in the criminal justice
system.
This change would not conflict with the general presumption of
openness, as the integral parts of the court record would remain
accessible to the public, both at the courthouse and electronically.
It would, however, shift the burden from the victim or witness, to
the defendant, to prove that the telephone number and address of
the victim or witness is crucial to the record.
246.
247.

Supra note 236.
See supra Part III(E)(3).
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The change to the criminal procedure code would allow the
move toward electronic and remote access to occur without
endangering the rights and welfare of victims and witnesses. The
change would also allow victims and witnesses to move on after
their innocent involvement in the criminal justice system, without
their privacy being forever lost with their personal information
being unnecessarily included as a part of the public record.

John Losinger

